The argument about whether or not the maritime industry needs more regulations is a perennial one. From time to time leading figures from the shipping sector will stand up and state that what is needed is not additional regulations and fatter rulebooks but, rather, more effective implementation of the requirements that are in place. They believe that calls for more regulations stem from accidents caused by lack of adherence to the existing regime.
Most would agree with that stance and the reasoning behind it. A fine body of maritime rules and regulations has been built up over more than a century and much of the fabric of today’s safety blanket has been established as a result of major disasters and hard-won lessons.
While the Titanics, Morro Castles and Exxon Valdezes of this world are the accidents everyone remembers, there have been a myriad of container ship and ferry fires, tanker explosions, bulk carrier losses, Ro/Ro ship capsizes and navigational errors that have contributed to our greater understanding of where dangers lie and how to mitigate them.
The maritime community has also welcomed a tightening up of the implementation and enforcement of this regulatory regime in recent decades. The punitive measures now in place and poised to come down on those parties found guilty of causing a shipping accident have undoubtedly contributed to the notable improvements that have been achieved in maritime safety. The ability of the media to bring intimate details of a shipping accident into everyone’s living room has also helped make safety a top board room priority.
Despite the progress that has been made, the pleas to bring the rulemaking process to a complete halt are somewhat unrealistic. The rapid technological advances that are sweeping across modern life also impact shipping. New equipment and control arrangements, new fuels and propulsion systems, new types of vessel and new operational procedures are continuously being introduced and need to be accommodated in a constant fine-tuning of the regulatory regime.
In addition, the shipping community is being replenished with newcomers on a day-by-day basis and the battle against ignorance is an ongoing one. Regulators also have to take note of the general public’s rising expectations in terms of both further improvements in shipping’s safety record and environmental performance and in the drive towards the goal of zero defects.
One of the best indicators of the efficacy of the maritime regulatory regime and where there may still be rulebook weaknesses is the accident investigation. The number of shipping incidents today requiring investigations are thankfully few. Those that do occur are usually found to be caused by a confluence of factors. Several mistakes in a particularly sequence will have to have been made for the accident to take place.
Notwithstanding the underlying strength of the current maritime rulebook, from conventions and regulations down to codes and guidelines, an accident investigation will always provide a lesson to be learned or, at the very least, a timely reminder.
There is also the possibility of cross-fertilisation, for the mariner to learn something from the experience of his counterpart from another sector of industry. As an example, the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in its recently released accident investigation report on a San Francisco airliner crash in 2013, which killed three and injured almost 200, concluded that the aircraft’s complex control systems were partially to blame.
Although pilot error was identified as the primary cause, NTSB recommended that the aircraft manufacturer make changes to the increasingly complicated automated controls which, it claimed, pilots no longer “fully understand”. Such a finding may have some resonance amongst seafarers confronting newly installed automated control and monitoring systems when joining their ships for their next tour of duty.
Established in 1967, the US NTSB has made significant contributions to maritime safety, including the international IMO regulatory regime, over the years. An independent federal agency with a mandate to investigate accidents and promote safety in the transportation industry, it can only make recommendations. However, it has established a reputation for independence and objectivity, and the direct and unequivocal recommendations for safety improvements stemming from its investigations are inevitably taken up and given clout by US law-makers.
The most noted repercussion of the Exxon Valdez tanker grounding in Alaska in March 1989 is the mandate that tankers worldwide be fitted with double hulls. Yet NTSB also carried out a detailed investigation of the human factors involved in that accident. It concluded that the probable cause of the grounding of the tanker was due to a series of crew, management and port authority-related factors.
These included the failure of the Third Mate to properly manoeuvre the vessel because of fatigue and excessive workload; the failure of the Master to provide a proper navigation watch because of impairment from alcohol; the failure of the ship owner to provide a fit Master and a rested and sufficient crew; the lack of an effective vessel traffic service because of inadequate equipment and manning levels, inadequate personnel training, and deficient management oversight; and the lack of effective pilotage services.
That was 25 years ago and these shortcomings are a thing of the past in virtually every part of the world. In the meantime, NTSB has continued to maintain its high standards. The agency admits that because transport accidents are almost always limited in scope and time, it is possible to conduct in-depth forensic investigations from which concrete conclusions and actionable remedies can be drawn. All stakeholders, not just those directly involved in an accident, can derive benefit from the Board’s findings as a result.
Another recent accident investigation is that carried out by the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (NDCP) into a small spillage of LNG that occurred during bunkering operations on a gas-powered cruise ferry. The Directorate’s report highlights one of the new risks confronting the shipping industry.
The incident in question occurred in the Stavanger port zone of Risavika this past May. The vessel was moored at her ferry berth and was being bunkered by means of an LNG road tanker when the cryogenic transfer hose between the ship and the vehicle disconnected. Some 130 kg of LNG escaped before the emergency disconnect valves sealed the flow.
The spillage did not lead to any personnel injuries or any damage to the ship. The incident occurred while the LNG-powered cruise ferry was also conducting a ship stability test at the jetty, and NDCP concluded that the concurrent stability test caused a vessel movement that strained the hose connection to the ship’s bunker manifold to the point where separation occurred.
In this case the ship owner and the provider of the LNG have implemented additional preventative measures aimed at increasing safety levels during bunkering operations. They are also working closely together to ensure that procedures between ship and shore are synchronised and that LNG bunkering training and contingency planning procedures are upgraded. Improvements to the training regime need to be carried out in cooperation with other interested parties, including the emergency services.
There are currently 52 LNG-fuelled vessels that are not LNG carriers in service and the fleet is set to grow rapidly as more ship owners opt for this clean-burning fuel as a way of complying with increasingly strict environmental legislation. The bunkering of these vessels is bringing a broad new swathe of the maritime community into contact with a product of which they have no previous knowledge and that requires particularly careful handling with specialist equipment.
The small spillage of LNG in Risavika provides a timely, salutary lesson for the global shipping industry. Mariners are now taking steps, not least through IMO, to ensure that the relevant parts of the safety regime established by the LNG carrier sector are now applied to all those involved with this new type of vessel bunkering. That involves extending the rulebook.
Editor’s Note: Mike Corkhill is a technical journalist and consultant specialising in oil, gas and chemical transport, including tanker shipping and chemical logistics. A qualified Naval Architect, he has written books on LNG, LPG, chemical and product tankers and is currently the Editor of LNG World Shipping.